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Abstract. Two simple and attractive mechanisms for the fair division of indivis-
ible goods in an online setting are LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. We study some
fundamental computational problems concerning the outcomes of these mech-
anisms. In particular, we consider what expected outcomes are possible, what
outcomes are necessary and how to compute their exact outcomes. In general, we
show that such questions are more tractable to compute for LIKE than for BA-
LANCED LIKE. As LIKE is strategy proof but BALANCED LIKE is not, we also
consider the computational problem of how, with BALANCED LIKE, an agent can
compute a strategic bid to improve their outcome. We prove that this problem is
intractable in general.
1 Introduction
Fair division is a fundamental problem in allocating resources among competing agents.
Many practical fair division problems are online. We present two such settings. For
example, in a food bank, we must start allocating food as it is donated. It is too late
to wait until the end of the day before we start distributing the food to charities. As a
second example, in allocating deceased organs to patients we must match newly donated
organs swiftly. We cannot wait till more organs arrive before deciding on the precise
match.
Motivated by such problems, Walsh has proposed a simple online model for the fair
division of indivisible items in which the items arrive over time [19]. Aleksandrov et
al. analysed two simple and attractive randomized mechanisms for such fair division
problems: LIKE and BALANCED LIKE [1]. The LIKE mechanism allocates an arriving
item uniformly at random between the agents that “like” it. It satisfies equal treatment
of equals, and it is both strategy proof and envy free ex ante [1]. Indeed, any mech-
anism that is envy free ex ante assigns items to agents with the same probabilities as
LIKE does. However, the LIKE mechanism is not very fair ex post as it can possibly
allocate all items to one agent. The BALANCED LIKE mechanism is fairer. It allocates
an arriving item uniformly at random between the agents that “like” it who have the
fewest items currently. BALANCED LIKE bounds the envy one agent has for another’s
allocation ex post. However, this comes at the price of no longer being strategy proof
in general [1]. When restricted to 2 agents and 0/1 utilities, BALANCED LIKE is strat-
egy proof. These mechanisms are simple and satisfy many desirable axioms. For these
reasons, we now turn attention to their computational properties.
In practice, it may be difficult to query the agents each time an item arrives. The
chair will often collect the preferences of the agents in advance, and allocate items to
agents as they arrive. There are several settings where it is reasonable to suppose that the
chair does that. For instance, in the food bank problem, a good proxy for the utility of an
item to a charity that likes it might simply be its retail price. This is public information.
As a second example, in deceased organ matching, the utility of allocating an organ to
a patient might be computed from a simple formula that takes account of the age of
the organ, the age of the patient and a number of other medical factors. This is again
public information. The chair might then be interested in what outcomes are possible,
necessary or exact based on these declared preferences. For example, the chair might be
concerned that agents receive enough utility or particular essential items. Alternatively,
the chair might want to be sure that a favored agent gets a particular item. Also, they
might even want to give similar utility to each agent or bias the future allocation in case
some agents receive only a few items and are promised to receive more in expectation.
There are two sources of uncertainty in deciding these outcomes. First, both mech-
anisms are randomized. Therefore each mechanism returns a probability distribution
over actual outcomes. Second, as the problem is online, the arrival order of items is typ-
ically unknown. We consider here the problem of the chair computing what outcomes
are possible, necessary or exact depending on both sources of uncertainty. In partic-
ular, we focus on computing whether an agent can possibly or necessarily receive a
given expected utility. These results easily translate into whether an agent can possibly
or necessarily receive a given item. We simply give most of the agent’s utility to that
item. Also, as all our results hold in the case of binary utilities, they can also be viewed
as computing whether an agent can possibly or necessarily receive a given expected
number of items. Whilst some of our results consider general utilities, such utilities are
mainly used to compare outcomes and do not need to be elicited explicitly. General util-
ities are not used when bidding or allocating items. Such “like” and “not like” reporting
has advantages. It is simple, does not require costly eliciting of utilities of agents for
items and it also leads to mechanisms with nice axioms.
Our contributions: We consider three settings: the chair knows the arrival order-
ing of items, the arrival ordering is drawn from some probability distribution, and the
allocation of past items is known. In all settings, we study the problem of the chair
computing possible, necessary and exact outcomes of LIKE and BALANCED LIKE. For
both mechanisms, these problems are intractable even with 2 agents and when the or-
dering of items is not fixed. In contrast, with any number of agents, computing each
of these outcomes is tractable for LIKE and intractable for BALANCED LIKE when the
ordering of items is fixed. Interestingly, computing outcomes with BALANCED LIKE
becomes tractable in this setting only when restricted to 2 agents. Further, computing
outcomes is tractable for both mechanisms at a certain moment of time when a new item
arrives supposing the allocation of past items is known. In addition, we study a closely
related problem of whether an agent can manipulate these mechanisms by strategically
misreporting their preferences. Our computational results have a number of interesting
consequences. For example, recall that the BALANCED LIKE mechanism is fairer but
not strategy proof. However, we show that computing a manipulation of this mechanism
is intractable in general.
2 Preliminaries
We next provide basic definitions of online instances, the LIKE and BALANCED LIKE
mechanisms and their outcomes.
Allocation instance: An instance I = (A,O,U,∆) of an online fair division prob-
lem has (1) a set A of agents a1, . . . , an, (2) a set O of indivisible items o1, . . . , om, (3)
a matrix U = (uik)m×n where uik is the cardinal utility of agent ai for item ok and (4)
a matrix∆ = (δkj)m×m where δkj is a probability that item ok arrives in moment j.
We consider binary utilities and general rational non-negative utilities. We say that
agent ai likes item ok if uik > 0. Further, we assume that one item arrives in each
moment j, i.e.
∑
k=1:m δkj = 1.
Online setting: Suppose items o1 to oj have arrived at moments 1 to j, respectively.
Given o = (o1, . . . , oj), let ∆(o) be its probability, π(j, o) the current allocation of
these items to agents, p(π(j, o)) its probability and ui(π(j, o)) the additive utility of
agent ai for the items they receive in π(j, o). Now, suppose that item ok arrives at
moment (j + 1) with probability δk(j+1) when each agent ai places a rational non-
negative bid vik for this item and a mechanism then decides its allocation to a feasible
agent in an onlinemanner, i.g. given π(j, o) and no information about future items.
Mechanisms: We consider the randomized LIKE and BALANCED LIKE mecha-
nisms from [1]. With the LIKE mechanism, agent ai is feasible for item ok if vik > 0.
With the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, agent ai is feasible for item ok if vik > 0 and
have so far received fewest items given π(j, o) among those agents that bid positively
for item ok. Let the number of feasible agents be fk. The probability that a feasible
agent ai is allocated item ok is equal to 1/fk.
Possible, necessary and exact outcomes: We consider expected probabilities de-
pending on what information is available to the chair. If the allocation π(j, o) is the
only available information, we use pi(j + 1, π(j, o)) for the probability of agent ai for
the item that arrives at moment (j + 1). If the order o is the only available information,
we use pi(j + 1, o) for the probability of agent ai for the item that arrives at moment
(j + 1). It is equal to
∑
π(j,o) p(π(j, o)) · pi(j + 1, π(j, o)). If there is no information
about o or π(j, o), we use pi(j + 1) for the probability of agent ai for the item that
arrives at moment (j+1). It is equal to
∑
o∆(o) ·pi(j+1, o). We next define expected
utilities of agents for items in each of these settings. Given π(j, o), we use uij(π(j, o))
for the utility of agent ai. It is equal to ui(π(j, o)) + pi(j +1, π(j, o)). Given o, we use
uij(o) for the utility of agent ai. It is equal to
∑
π(j,o) p(π(j, o)) ·ui(π(j, o)). Given∆,
we use uij(∆) for the utility of agent ai. It is equal to
∑
o∆(o) · uij(o).
The probability (or utility) of agent ai at moment j is possible if their probability
(or utility) is positive. The outcome of agent ai at moment j is necessary at least some
rational number k if their probability (or utility) is at least k. We also say that the
outcome of agent ai at moment j is exact if we want to compute the exact value of their
probability (or utility).
We study the complexity of computing possible, necessary and exact outcomes. For
a mechanism that allocates all items to agents that like them, note that possible and
necessary outcomes are directly related. For this reason, we only study necessary and
exact outcomes. Our results for possible outcomes are inherited. We next show this
relation.
Suppose we ask if pi(j + 1) > 0 holds. This is true iff there is an ordering o and
allocation π(j, o) of the first j items such that pi(j + 1, π(j, o)) > 0. We therefore
conclude that pi(j + 1) > 0 iff pi(j + 1) ≥ ǫ where 0 < ǫ ≤ mino,π(j,o)∆(o) ·
p(π(j, o))·pi(j+1, π(j, o)). Note that this minimumvalue is positive and, consequently,
such ǫ always exists. Such a relation is not true for utilities. For the utility of agent ai,
we have that uij(∆) > 0 holds iff agent ai bids positively for at least one item and at
least one item arrives. This problem is easy to decide. However, deciding if uij(∆) ≥ k
holds might not be so easy.
Recall that we consider three settings: when the past allocation of items to agents
is known, when the ordering of items is unknown and when the ordering of items is
known. We next observe that all outcomes are tractable in the setting when the past
allocation is known, fixed and no information about future items is available.
Items arriving online: Let us suppose that the first j items have arrived and their
allocation be π(j, o). Suppose now that item ok arrives at moment (j+1). For both LIKE
and BALANCED LIKE, the exact value of pi(j+1, π(j, o)) is equal to
∑
k=1:m δk(j+1) ·
(1/fk) and the exact value of ui(π(j, o)) is equal to the sum of the cardinal utilities of
agent ai for the items they are allocated in π(j, o). Both of these exact outcomes, the
value of uij(π(j, o)) and therefore any possible and necessary outcomes in this setting
can be computed in O(m · n) time and space.
We use popular reductions and computational problems from computational com-
plexity, graph theory and set theory in order to show our hardness results.
Computational complexity: We use complexity classes of decision and counting
problems such as P, NP, coNP and#P, and mappings such as Karp, Turing, parsimo-
nious and arithmetic reductions [7,16,17].
Graph theory: Let G be an undirected bipartite graph. A matching µ in G is a set
of vertex-disjoint edges. We say that µ matches a vertex if there is an edge in it that
is incident with the vertex. Matching µ is maximal if it is no longer a matching once
some other edge is added to it. Matching µ is perfect if it matches all vertices in G.
Given a graph G and a number k, the minimum size maximal matching problem is to
decide if there is a matching µ in G with |µ| ≤ k. It is NP-hard on various bipartite
graphs [9,15]. Given a graphG, the counting perfect matchings problem is to output the
number of perfect matchings in G. It is#P-hard on various bipartite graphs [14,18].
Set theory: Let S be a set of integers and b, c be integers. A (b, c)-subset of S is a
subset of S whose elements sum up to b and its cardinality is c. The (b, c)-subset sum
problem is to decide if there is a (b, c)-subset of S. Note that there is a (b, c)-subset of
S for at least one c ∈ [1, |S|] iff there is a subset of S whose elements sum up to b. The
latter problem is the NP-hard b-subset sum problem [11].
This paper is structured as follows. In Section 3, the items are drawn from some
known probabilistic distribution ∆. For example, such distribution in the food bank
problem could be estimated based on historical data. In Section 4, we suppose the or-
dering o in which the items will arrive is fixed, i.e. for each moment j, we have that
δkj = 1 holds for exactly one item ok. Again, in the food bank problem, some charities
donate certain items on a regular basis and only at specific moments. In Section 5, we
consider problems of computing manipulations of these mechanisms.
3 Items Arriving from a Distribution
We suppose the agents act sincerely and begin with the case when the chair knows the
utilities but the items come from a distribution∆ whose size is polynomial in n andm.
STOCHASTICEXACTUTILITY
Input: I = (A,O,U,∆), ai.
Output: uim(∆).
STOCHASTICNECESSARYUTILITY
Input: I = (A,O,U,∆), ai, k ∈ Q.
Question: uim(∆) ≥ k?
The stochastic exact outcomes of LIKE and BALANCED LIKE are #P-hard with
just two agents. Our reduction is motivated by the food bank problem. Let m items
be donated by m suppliers and not each of the suppliers can donate each of the items.
This relation could be viewed as an undirected bipartite graph. The items are in one
partition. The suppliers are in another partition. Let us enumerate them from 1 to m.
There is an edge between an item and a supplier if the supplier donates the item. Each
perfect matching in the graph then can be viewed as an ordering w.r.t. the enumeration
of the suppliers in which each of them different suppliers donates exactly one of them
different items. At the beginning of the day, the chair does not know the actual order in
which the suppliers will donate items but they can estimate it by computing an estimate
δkj for each item ok and moment j. Based on past data whose size is polynomial in
m, one such estimate could be the number of days of past data in which each of them
items is donated from a different supplier amongst them suppliers divided by the total
number of days of past data. We give a reduction from the counting perfect matchings
problem to STOCHASTICEXACTUTILITY.
Reduction 1 Let G be a (3-regular) bipartite graph with M vertices in each partition.
The allocation instance IG has:
– Agents: agents a1 and a2 (i.e. 2 agents),
– Items: items o1 to oM (i.e.M items),
– Utilities: uij = 1 for each ai and oj , and
– Distribution: δkj = 1/M for each ok and j.
Theorem 1 With n = 2 agents, 0/1 utilities and the LIKE or BALANCED LIKE mecha-
nism, problem STOCHASTICEXACTUTILITY is #P-hard under arithmetic reductions.
Proof. WLOG, the set of orderings of items is equal to the set of perfect matchings
in G united with the set of oǫ that reveals no items. Each ordering oM that reveals M
items corresponds to a perfect matching in G w.r.t. the enumeration of the suppliers in
G. We suppose the items arrive independently of each other and across the different
time moments. Consequently, ordering oM occurs with probability 1/M
M and the ex-
pected utility uiM (oM ) is M/2 with both mechanisms as both agents have the same
utilities for items. The ordering oǫ reveals 0 items. It occurs with probability 1 minus
(1/MM ) multiplied by the number of perfect matchings in G and ui0(oǫ) is 0 with
both mechanisms as no items are revealed. We quickly obtain that uiM (∆) is equal
to (1/MM ) · (M/2) multiplied by the number of perfect matchings in G. The result
follows. ✷
We further showed that stochastic necessary outcomes of these mechanisms areNP-
hard with just two agents. We omit the complete proof for reasons of space but we give
the main reduction which is from the (b, c)-subset sum problem. Given set of integers
S = {n1, . . . , nM} and integers b and c, we construct instance IS,b,c: (1) agents a1 and
a2, (2) item ok for each nk ∈ S, (3) agent ai values item ok with nk, and (4) δkj = 1/M
for each item ok and moment j. The instance of STOCHASTICNECESSARYUTILITY has
IS,b,c, agent ai and constant k = (1/M
c) · (b/2). Let us order each subset of S w.r.t.
the enumeration (1, . . . ,M). The set of orderings is now equal to the set of ordered
(b, c)-subsets of S united with the set of oǫ that reveals no items. Similarly to the proof
of Theorem 1, it should be easy now for the reader to show that there is a (b, c)-subset
of S iff uiM (∆) ≥ k.
4 Items Arriving from a Fixed Ordering
We again suppose the agents act sincerely and next consider the case that the chair
knows the utilities and the arrival ordering of future items. This corresponds to the case
when exactly one item arrives with probability of one at each moment in time.
EXACTUTILITY
Input: I = (A,O,U, o), ai.
Output: uim(o).
NECESSARYUTILITY
Input: I = (A,O,U, o), ai, k ∈ Q.
Question: uim(o) ≥ k?
4.1 The Case of n > 2 Agents
Let there be n > 2 agents. Interestingly, the outcomes of the LIKE mechanism become
tractable whereas the ones of the BALANCED LIKE mechanism remain intractable even
when the ordering is fixed.
Exact Outcomes Let us start with the LIKE mechanism. This mechanism does not
keep track of the allocation of past items. As a result, any agent is feasible for each next
item supposing they like this item. Indeed, all exact outcomes are tractable with this
mechanism for this reason.
Observation 1 With general utilities and the LIKE mechanism, problem EXACTUTIL-
ITY is in P.
Proof. The probability pi(j, o) of agent ai for item oj is 1/nj where nj is the number
of agents that like the item. Their utility uim(o) can be given as
∑m
j=1(1/nj) · uij . ✷
We continue with exact allocations for the BALANCED LIKE mechanism and give
a parsimonious reduction from counting perfect matchings problem to EXACTUTILITY.
The counting problem remains in#P-hard even on 3-regular undirected bipartite graphs
in [8]. Our reduction is very insightful because it provides a very tight bound on the
complexity of EXACTUTILITY (i.e. 0/1 utilities, each agent likes at most 4 items, each
item except one is liked by at most 3 agents, each pair of agents like at most 3 items in
common, the ordering is fixed, etc.).
Reduction 2 LetG be a 3-regular bipartite graph, u1, . . . , uN be the vertices from one
of its partitions and v1, . . . , vN the vertices from the other one of its partitions. For each
vertex ui, let vi1, vi2, vi3 denote the vertices connected to it and e3·(i−1)+1 = (ui, vi1),
e3·(i−1)+2 = (ui, vi2), e3·(i−1)+3 = (ui, vi3) the edges incident with it. Each edge ek
can be represented as (ui, vj) for some ui ∈ {u1, . . . , uN} and vj ∈ {vi1, vi2, vi3}. We
use the graph and next construct the online allocation instance EG as follows:
– Agents: 1 agent ak per edge ek and 3 special agents a3·N+1, a3·N+2 and a3·N+3
(i.e. 3 ·N + 1 agents),
– Items: 1 item per vertex vj , 2 items ui1, ui2 per vertex ui and 3 special items w
and x (i.e. 3 ·N + 2 items),
– Non-zero utilities: for i ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ {1, 2, 3}, agent a3·(i−1)+j has utility 1 for
items vij , ui1, ui2, x; agent a3·N+1 has utility 1 for items w, x, and
– Ordering: o = (v1 . . . vNu11u12 . . . uN1uN2wx).
We highlight the main idea behind the proof of the next Lemma 1. Basically, we
showed that computing the number of allocations of the first 3 · N + 1 items in o in
which each agent receives exactly one item is in#P-complete.
Lemma 1 With the BALANCED LIKE mechanism, the number of allocations in EG in
which agent a3·N+1 is feasible for item x is equal to 2
N times the number of perfect
matchings in G. Computing it is in #P-hard under arithmetic reductions.
Proof. By construction, each item vj is liked by three different agents and, hence, each
allocation of v1, . . . , vN gives these items to N different agents among a1, . . . , a3·N .
Consider then an allocation of v1, . . . , vN such that, for each vertex ui, either agent
a3·(i−1)+1 gets item vi1 or agent a3·(i−1)+2 gets item vi2 or agent a3·(i−1)+3 gets
item vi3. We say that such an allocation of v1, . . . , vN has perfect matches for vertices
u1, . . . , uN because exactly one agent per triplet a3·(i−1)+1, a3·(i−1)+2, a3·(i−1)+3 gets
an item among v1, . . . , vN . In fact, there is a perfect matching inG over v1, . . . , vN and
u1, . . . , uN iff there is an allocation in EG of v1, . . . , vN that has perfect matches for
u1, . . . , uN . Furthermore, this is a 1-to-1 parsimonious correspondence. Each allocation
π in EG of the first 3 ·N+1 items in o in which each agent among a1, . . . , a3·N , a3·N+1
receives exactly one item occurs with positive probability. We call π perfect allocation
over the first 3·N+1 items in o. We show that there is an allocation in EG of v1, . . . , vN
that has perfect matches for u1, . . . , uN iff there are 2
N perfect allocations such as π
in EG. Moreover, this is a 1-to-2
N arithmetic correspondence. In other words, we show
that the number of perfect allocations such as π in EG is equal to 2
N times the number
of perfect matchings in G.
First, let us consider one discrete allocation π1 in EG of v1, . . . , vN that has per-
fect matches for u1, . . . , uN . The allocation π1 occurs with positive probability be-
cause v1, . . . , vN are liked by disjoint sets of three agents. WLOG, suppose that π1 is
such that, for each ui, agent a3·(i−1)+1 receives their corresponding item vi1. The al-
location π1 can be extended by the mechanism to two discrete allocations w.r.t. each
ui: (1) agent a3·(i−1)+2 gets item ui1 and agent a3·(i−1)+3 gets item ui2 or (2) agent
a3·(i−1)+2 gets item ui2 and agent a3·(i−1)+3 gets item ui1. By the preference struc-
ture, π1 can then be extended by the mechanism to 2
N perfect allocations in EG. Note
that each of these perfect allocations necessarily gives item w to agent a3·N+1 be-
cause only they like it. Second, consider one perfect allocation in EG. It must be the
case that it extends some discrete allocation of v1, . . . , vN that has perfect matches
for u1, . . . , uN . To show this, consider a discrete allocation π2 of v1, . . . , vN that has
not perfect matches for u1, . . . , uN . Hence, π2 is such that at least two of the agents
a3·(i−1)+1, a3·(i−1)+2, a3·(i−1)+3 for some vertex ui receive their corresponding items
vi1, vi2, vi3 of v1, . . . , vN . Therefore, each allocation of all items that extends π2 by us-
ing the mechanism gives item ui1 or item ui2 to one of the agents a3·(i−1)+1, a3·(i−1)+2,
a3·(i−1)+3 as their second item. As a consequence, in each such allocation, there is an-
other agent with zero items after round 3 ·N +1. We conclude that each such extension
of π2 is not a perfect allocation in EG. ✷
Theorem 2 With n > 2 agents, 0/1 utilities and the BALANCED LIKE mechanism,
problem EXACTUTILITY is in #P-hard under arithmetic reductions.
Proof. Let us consider allocation π = π(3 · N + 1, o) of the first 3 · N + 1 items
in o in which each agent among a1, . . . , a3·N , a3·N+1 receives exactly one item. Note
that agent a3·N+1 gets item x with positive conditional probability only given such
allocations because all agents like item x. By the preference structure, we conclude
that π occurs with probability p(π) = (1/3N) · (1/2N). The conditional probabil-
ity pi(x|π) of agent a3·N+1 for item x given π is equal to 1/(3 · N + 1) because all
agents a1, . . . , a3·N , a3·N+1 like item x. The conditional probability of agent a3·N+1
for item x is 0 given any other allocation. Therefore, p3·N+1(x, o) is equal to (1/3
N) ·
(1/2N) · (1/(3 · N + 1)) multiplied by the number of allocations such as π in which
agent a3·N+1 is feasible for item x. Finally, the expected utility u(3·N+1)(3·N+3)(o) =
p3·N+1(w, o) + p3·N+1(x, o). We have that p3·N+1(w, o) = 1 because only agent
a3·N+1 likes item w and the mechanism allocates each item to an agent. The result
follows by Lemma 1. ✷
Necessary Outcomes The tractability of the exact allocations of the LIKE mechanism
entails the tractability of its necessary allocations. By Observation 1, we conclude the
next immediate result.
Observation 2 With general utilities and the LIKE mechanism, problemNECESSARYU-
TILITY is in P.
We next focus on the necessary outcomes of the BALANCED LIKE mechanism. We
give a Karp reduction from minimum size maximal matching problem to the negation of
NECESSARYUTILITY. The minimum size maximal matching problem is shown to be
NP-hard on subdivision graphs of degree at most 3 in [12].
Reduction 3 Let us have a subdivision graph G of degree at most 3 and integer r.
The graph G is bipartite with vertices u1, . . . , uN of degree exactly 2 and vertices
v1, . . . , vM of degree at most 3. WLOG, we can assume that N ≥ M and there are
no two vertices from U that are connected to the same two vertices from V . We con-
struct an allocation instance PG,r as follows:
– Agents: 2 agents ui1, ui2 per ui and agents a1, . . . , aN−r, b1, . . . , bM and c (i.e.
3 ·N +M − r + 1 agents),
– Items: 1 item per vj and items x1, . . . , xN , y1, . . . , yN , z1, . . . , zN−r and w (i.e.
3 ·N +M − r + 1 items),
– Non-zero utilities: for each i ∈ [1, N ], j ∈ {1, 2}, agent uij has utility 1 for items
xi, vij , yi, z1, . . . , zN−r; for each i ∈ [1, N − r], agent ai has utility 1 for items
x1, . . . , xN ; agents b1, . . . , bM have each utility 1 for item w; agent c has utility 1
for items zN−r, w, and
– Ordering: o = (x1 . . . xNv1 . . . vMy1 . . . yNz1 . . . zN−rw).
The expected utility of each of the agents b1, . . . , bM is at least 1/M iff pc(w, o) =
0. This observation holds because each of the agents b1 to bM have equal utilities for
items in which case they receive item w with the same probability which apparently is
also equal to their expected utility as this is the only item they like. Theorem 3 follows
from this observation.
Theorem 3 With n > 2 agents, 0/1 utilities and the BALANCED LIKE mechanism,
problem NECESSARYUTILITY is in coNP-hard under Turing reductions.
Proof. There is a maximal matching in G of cardinality at most r iff there is an allo-
cation in PG,r in which agent c receives item w iff pc(w, o) > 0. The second “iff” is
trivial. We, therefore, focus on the first “iff”. The “only if” direction is easier to show
and, for reasons of space, we only show the more difficult “if” direction. Suppose next
that π is an allocation of all items in PG,r in which agent c receives item w.
1. Item w is allocated in π to agent c as their first item. To see this, suppose they also
get some items among zN−r. Now, they would not be feasible when item w arrives
as agents b1, . . . , bM have zero items in π and the mechanism would have given
item w to an agent among b1, . . . , bM and not to agent c.
2. Prior to item w in π, agent c have received zero items. Hence, items z1, . . . , zN−r
are allocated in π to N − r agents as their first items. By the preferences, these
agents are from different pairs among u11, u12, . . . , uN1, uN2 because, for each
pair of agents ui1, ui2, either ui1 or ui2 is forced to get item yi. WLOG, let us
assume that agents u11, . . . , u(N−r)1 get items z1, . . . , zN−r in π.
3. Prior to item z1 in π, agents u11, . . . , u(N−r)1 have zero items. Hence,N − r items
among y1, . . . , yN are allocated in π to u12, . . . , u(N−r)2 as their first items. These
items are y1, . . . , yN−r. For i in [N − r + 1, N ], we note that item yi is allocated
in π to either ui1 or ui2 as their first or second item.
4. Prior to item y1 in π, agents u11, u12, . . . , u(N−r)1, u(N−r)2 have zero items. By
the preferences, agents a1, . . . , aN−r must then receive items x1, . . . , xN−r in
π. For i in [N − r + 1, N ], item xi is allocated in π to either ui1 or ui2, say
ui2. We conclude that agents u(N−r+1)1, . . . , uN1 have zero items prior to item v1
in π. Moreover, only agents u(N−r+1)1, u(N−r+1)2, . . . , uN1, uN2 receive items
v1, . . . , vM in π. Finally, only l ≤ r agents among u(N−r+1)1, . . . , uN1 get items
in π among v1, . . . , vM as first items as some of these agents might like the same
items among v1, . . . , vM . WLOG, let these agents be u(N−l+1)1, . . . , uN1 and they
are allocated in π items v1, . . . , vl as first items.
The constructed set µπ = {(uN−l+1, v1), . . . , (uN , vl)} contains only edges from
the graph G which are vertex-disjoint. Therefore, this set is a matching in G. More-
over, the cardinality of this set is l at most r. We next show that µπ is a maximal
matching. For the sake of contradiction, suppose that µπ remains a matching if we
add a new edge to it, say (u, v). The edge (u, v) is vertex-disjoint with the edges
in µπ. This means that vertex u is not among uN−l+1, . . . , uN and vertex v is not
among v1, . . . , vl. Hence, vertex u is among u1, . . . , uN−l. In the allocation π, agents
u11, u12, . . . , u(N−r)1, u(N−r)2 do not receive any items among v1, . . . , vM . This im-
plies that all these agents are feasible for the items they like among v1, . . . , vM but
they do not get them in π. As agents u(N−l+1)1, . . . , uN1 get items v1, . . . , vl as their
first items, we conclude that some agents among u(N−l+1)1, u(N−l+1)2 . . . , uN1, uN2
receive items vl+1, . . . , vM as their second items. Therefore, it must be the case that all
agents u11, u12, . . . , u(N−r)1, u(N−r)2 do not like any item among vl+1, . . . , vM . Oth-
erwise, the mechanism would allocate some of these items to agents among u11, u12,
. . . , u(N−r)1, u(N−r)2. This is just the way in which the mechanism works. And, we
reached a contradiction with the existence of the allocation π. Finally, in the graph G,
vertices u1, . . . , uN−r are connected only to vertices among v1, . . . , vl. Hence, v is
among v1, . . . , vl. This fact contradicts that µπ ∪ {(u, v)} is a matching. ✷
4.2 The Case of 2 Agents
By Observations 1 and 2, the outcomes of LIKE are tractable. Surprisingly, in contrast
to Theorems 1, 2 and 3, the outcomes of BALANCED LIKE become tractable with only
two agents and when the ordering of items is fixed.
Theorem 4 With n = 2 agents, general utilities and the BALANCED LIKE mechanism,
problems EXACTUTILITY and NECESSARYUTILITY are in P.
Proof. We use a dynamic program. Each state s = (p, q) in it encodes that agent a1
has p items, agent a2 has q items, and its probability p(s). By induction, we show that
there are at most 2 different states after each allocation round. In the base case, consider
round 1. There are at most 2 states after this round depending on whether both a1 and a2
or only one of them like the first item. In the hypothesis, consider round j and suppose
there are at most two states after round j. In the step case, consider round j + 1. Now,
there are two cases. In the first one, there is only one state after round j. The result
follows by the base case. In the second case, there are two states after round j. Let these
be (p, q) and (p − 1, q + 1) where p + q = j. If only one agent likes item oj+1, each
state transits into a new state and the result follows. If both a1 and a2 like item oj+1, we
consider four sub-cases depending on the difference p− q: (1) (p, q) and (p− 1, q+1)
for p− q > 2, (2) (q+2, q) and (q+1, q+1) for p− q = 2, (3) (q+1, q) and (q, q+1)
for p − q = 1 and (4) (q, q) and (q − 1, q + 1) for p − q = 0. For sub-case (1), each
state transits into one new state with the same probability. For sub-case (2), (q + 2, q)
transits into (q+2, q+1), and (q+1, q+1) into (q+2, q+1) and (q+1, q+2). For
sub-case (3), both states transit into the same new state with probability 1. For sub-case
(4), (q, q) transits into (q, q + 1) and (q + 1, q), and (q − 1, q + 1) into (q, q + 1). We
conclude that there are at most two different states after round j + 1 in each sub-case.
The probability p1(j+2, o) is equal to
∑
sj+1
p(sj+1) ·p(a1 gets oj+2|sj+1) where
sj+1 is such a state after round j + 1 in which agent a1 is feasible for item oj+2. The
conditional probability p(a1 gets oj+2|sj+1) of agent a1 for item oj+2 is (i) 0 or 1 in
sub-case (1), (ii) 0, 1/2 or 1 in sub-case (3) and (iii) the probability of the state in which
they are feasible in sub-cases (2) and (4). We can compute the states, their probabilities
and hence the probabilities of agents and their utilities in O(m) space and time. ✷
5 Manipulations
We next consider how agents can act strategically. The LIKE mechanism is strategy-
proof and hence agents have an incentive to bid sincerely for items. In contrast, the
BALANCED LIKE mechanism is not strategy-proof and agents can have an incentive
to bid strategically for items [1]. We thus focus on strategic misreporting of bids with
BALANCED LIKE. In particular, we study the worst case when the utilities and the
ordering of the items are known to the misreporting agent. Any complexity results, in
this case, provide lower bounds on the complexity in the case of partial or probabilistic
information. We formulate the next problems where uim(v
i, o) denotes the utility of
agent ai supposing their bid vector is v
i = (vi1, . . . , vim) and the other agents bid
sincerely. Let ui = (ui1, . . . , uim) denotes their sincere bid vector.
EXACTMANIPULATION
Input: I = (A,O,U, o), ai, u
i, vi.
Output: uim(v
i, o)− uim(u
i, o).
NECESSARYMANIPULATION
Input: I=(A,O,U, o), ai, v
i, ui, k ∈Q.
Question: uim(v
i, o)−uim(u
i, o) ≥ k?
Theorem 5 With n > 2 agents, 0/1 utilities and the BALANCED LIKE mechanism,
problem EXACTMANIPULATION is in #P-hard under arithmetic reductions.
Proof. Consider instance EG. Let us modify this instance a bit. We add one new item z
between items w and x in the ordering o such that only agent a3·N+1 likes z with 1. Let
FG denote this new instance. Suppose that all agents in FG bid sincerely. Thus, agent
a3·N+1 receives each of the items w and z each with probability 1 because they are the
only agent who likes them. However, they receive item x with probability 0. Therefore,
u(3·N+1)(3·N+3)(u
(3·N+1), o) = 2. Suppose that all agents in FG bid sincerely except
agent a3·N+1 who bids strategically 0 for item z. Let v
(3·N+1) be their bidding vector
in this case. We can now remove item z because no agent bids positively for it. But,
then we obtain instance EG. By Theorem 2, we have u(3·N+1)(3·N+3)(v
(3·N+1), o) =
1 + p3·N+1(x, o). The instance of EXACTMANIPULATION uses instance FG, agent
a3·N+1 and vectors u
(3·N+1) and v(3·N+1). Its hardness follows by Theorem 2. ✷
Observe that the truthful report of agent a3·N+1 in the proof of Theorem 5 leads to
their utility being 2 whereas their insincere report leads to their utility being at most 2.
Hence, their strategic move cannot lead to an increase in their utility but the computation
of the exact difference in utility is intractable. However, as we discuss next, computing
an exact profitable insincere report that leads to such an increase is also intractable.
Necessary manipulations might be easy even when exact manipulations are hard.
For example, in the proof of Theorem 5, suppose that agent a3·N+1 has cardinal util-
ity for item x that is strictly greater than (3N ).(3N + 1). If they bid sincerely, their
expected utility is 2. If they bid strategically zero for item z, their expected utility is
strictly greater than 2. This necessary increase can be decided in polynomial time but
computing the exact increase is intractable. However, necessary manipulations are also
in general not always easy even if we ask merely for any increase in the expected utility
of a given agent.
Theorem 6 With n > 2 agents, 0/1 utilities and the BALANCED LIKE mechanism,
problem NECESSARYMANIPULATION is in coNP-hard under Turing reductions.
Proof. Consider instancePG,r. Suppose all agents bid sincerely. Hence,uc(3N+M−r+1)
(uc, o) = pc(zN−r, o) + pc(w, o). Suppose all agents bid sincerely except agent c
who bids strategically 0 for item w. Let their bidding vector be vc. We have that
uc(3N+M−r+1)(v
c, o) = pc(zN−r, o). The instance of NECESSARYMANIPULATION
uses as input instance PG,r, agent c, vectors v
c and uc, and rational number k = 0. We
conclude that uc(3N+M−r+1)(v
c, o)−uc(3N+M−r+1)(u
c, o) ≥ 0 iff pc(w, o) = 0. The
result follows by Theorem 3. ✷
Another definition of the manipulation problem is whether a player can possibly
increase their utility by insincere reporting, rather than computing the necessary or exact
gain. Observe that in the proof of Theorem 6, we have that uc(3N+M−r+1)(u
c, o) −
uc(3N+M−r+1)(v
c, o) > 0 iff pc(w, o) > 0. We conclude that possible manipulations
are also intractable in general by the proof of Theorem 3. Finally, by Theorem 4, we
conclude that possible, necessary and exact manipulations are easy with just two agents
and items arriving from a fixed ordering. By Theorem 1 and the discussion after it, we
conclude that necessary and exact manipulations are hard with two agents and items
arriving from a distribution.
6 Related Work and Conclusion
We studied the worst-case computational complexity of possible, necessary and exact
outcomes returned by the LIKE and BALANCED LIKE mechanisms supposing agents
act sincerely.With LIKE, there is no benefit for agents to act strategically.With BALAN-
CED LIKE, the agents might be strategic but we proved that computing a manipulation is
computationally intractable in general. Some results are however tractable for the case
of 2 agents. Our study of the online allocations returned by the LIKE and BALANCED
LIKE mechanisms is in-line with many results in offline fair division, voting theory and
partial tournaments where possible, necessary and exact outcomes play crucial role;
see e.g. [2,4,5,20]. Our results provide a stepping stone towards better understanding
strategic behavior. A number of works already considered such behavior for offline
mechanisms; see e.g. [3,6]. Another interesting future directions would be to estimate
the outcomes of our mechanisms or to look at fixed-parameter tractable algorithms for
these problems [10,13,15].
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